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SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT ON STATE V JOHN INGRAM
PURTLE: REFLECTIONS ON THE GREAT DISSENTER
Samuel A. Perroni*
The fact of the matter is the late John Ingram Purtle is the only sitting
Supreme Court Justice in Arkansas history to be charged with a felony.'
There is no getting around it. And, before that event, his seven years of ser-
vice on the court had been anything but dull. On one occasion, for example,
he was accused by a popular and often erratic Pulaski County Sheriff,
Tommy Robinson, of having ties to organized crime because of his dissent
in a criminal case.2 There were others who believed him to be "a misfit out
of step with the times," while, on the other hand, there were those who con-
sidered him to be a bright spot on the court, a man who "didn't forsake his
humanity when he ascended to the state's highest bench."
3
Justice Purtle, a small town lawyer raised in a log cabin in Enola,
Faulkner County, was elected Associate Justice, Position 2, in the fall of
1978 after capturing fifty-three percent of the vote in the Democratic prima-
ry. He ran against Otis Turner, a consummate trial lawyer from Arkadelphia,
who was supported by a solid majority of the Bar. Justice Purtle's support
came, in large part, from teachers and unions whom he wooed from the back
of a paneled pick-up truck. His first eight-year term began in January 1979,
the year I left the United States Attorney's Office for private practice.
The first time I met Justice Purtle was six years later in the office of
William "Bill" R. Wilson Jr., currently a federal district court judge. Judge
Wilson and I had each been recommended by some of Justice Purtle's
* Samuel A. Perroni graduated from the University of Arkansas School of Law, Little
Rock (currently the UALR William H. Bowen School of Law) in 1974 with honors. He is a
former Assistant United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Arkansas and spent twen-
ty-nine years in private practice handling primarily white collar crime cases. Currently, he is
a writer, legal consultant and Adjunct Professor of White Collar Crime at the UALR William
H. Bowen School of Law.
1. Conspiracy to commit theft of property by deception in an arson-for-profit scheme.
Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-707 (currently codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-3-401 (Repl. 2006)). The
Felony Information was filed on August 28, 1985. State v. Shamlin (Pul. Cir. No. CR85-
2187) (1985).
2. See Grey v. State, 276 Ark. 331, 335-36, 334 S.W.2d 392, 394 (1982). Justice Purtle
replied by comparing the good sheriff's tactics to Adolph Hitler. Mara Leveritt, John Purtle's
Day in Court, ARK. TIMES, Aug. 1989, at 29.
3. Mara Leveritt, Judge Purtle Dissents, ARK. TIMES, Aug. 1989, at 29 (also quoting
John DiPippa, current Dean and Distinguished Professor of Law and Public Policy, Universi-
ty of Arkansas at Little Rock William H. Bowen School of Law, comparing Justice Purtle to
United States Supreme Court Justice William 0. Douglas).
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friends to be trial counsel in his criminal conspiracy case. Rather than com-
pete for the job, we decided to join forces, if he would have us. Before our
meeting, Judge Wilson and I discussed what we were going to charge for
our representation. I did not know Justice Purtle's financial condition but
Judge Wilson did. He told me, "Justice Purtle doesn't have anything." That
settled the matter as far as we were concerned. So we agreed to represent
him for free.
When we presented our plan, Justice Purtle would have nothing of it.
He insisted on paying us and came up with a fee of $25,000-having no
idea that our customary fees at the time were many times that amount. To
seal the fee agreement, we agreed to take a promissory note.4 Justice Purtle
also had a life insurance policy with a cash value of about $5000. He wanted
to cash it in and give it to us for expenses, but we would not let him. The
beneficiary was his estranged wife, and he was dutifully paying the pre-
miums each month as well as giving her one half of his salary. As for the
trial expenses, they were ultimately paid in large part by contributions from
lawyers. A sua sponte fundraising effort was spearheaded by Little Rock
lawyer Gail 0. Mathews. The funds were placed in a blind trust and, as far
as we know, Justice Purtle never knew who contributed to the fund. 5 If you
were a contributor, however, I can tell you he was humbled by the gesture
and forever grateful.
From our first meeting, I began to grow fond of Justice Purtle. He did
not engage in the understandable whining many people engage in when they
feel wrongfully accused. Oh, he had his opinions about the possible motives
behind his prosecution, but he did not allow that to interfere with his focus.
He also knew he needed to listen to us. Believe me, this was a concept that
escaped many of our clients. Over the many months we spent together, I
found him to be a gentle, kindhearted man with two immediate passions: the
law and a girlfriend with chronic financial problems. In the end, the former
would sustain him while the latter would nearly cause his downfall.
After the charges were filed, Justice Purtle's critics-and he certainly
had his share-seized the opportunity to point out why he should not be on
the Arkansas Supreme Court. Frankly, that did not surprise me. What disap-
pointed me the most, however, was the fact that some respected members of
the Arkansas Supreme Court began to publicly pressure him to resign and
4. After Justice Purtle was acquitted, Judge Wilson and I tore the note up and told
Justice Purtle to give the money to charity. In his Roller Funeral Home obituary, it was noted
that he was giving money to "over 100 charities" at his death. I was not surprised. He was the
kind of person who would give you his last dollar if you needed it.
5. Judge Wilson and I were criticized by some members of the establishment Bar for
representing Justice Purtle. One of those critics allegedly called a Supreme Court member,
claiming that we were unethical for using the expense fund.
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appeared to go out of their way to make him look bad in the media.6 Based
on what I saw, that movement contributed to our inability to seat a jury in
Pulaski County. To me, if there was one person in our state who should have
been able to embrace the presumption of innocence, it was a Supreme Court
Justice. I realize the vast majority of Americans pay lip service to this
mainstay of our criminal justice system. It is a hard concept for the average
person to truly accept. But Justices on the Arkansas Supreme Court should
accept it instinctively, and because they didn't, it still bothers me.
When the trial started in Little Rock, we had to excuse the first sixteen
jurors because they had formed opinions of guilt.7 Of the 105 jurors called to
court that first day, seventy-nine had read or seen news accounts of the case.
Neither Judge Wilson nor I have ever witnessed such widespread media
exposure in another criminal case.
Nevertheless, with the firestorm of criticism and publicity, I really be-
gan to understand Justice Purtle. Of course, he did not resign from the court.
Instead, he did acquiesce, at the request of five Justices, to "not participate
in conferences, the deciding of cases or the writing of opinions" until his
case was resolved.8 Logically, this arrangement suggested that Justice Purtle
6. See, e.g., George R. Smith, Letter to the Editor, ARKANSAS GAZETrE, November 7,
1985. The letter was published more than two months after the charges were filed and a week
before co-defendant Luther Shamlin's trial:
To the Editor:
The recent instances of misconduct on the part of judges and others in public of-
fice make us wish that every public officer could inscribe on his wall and carry in
his heart the words of Walter Lippman: "Those in high places are more than the
administrators of government bureaus. They are more than the writers of laws.
They are the custodians of a nation's ideals, of the beliefs it cherishes, of its per-
manent hopes, of the faith which makes a nation out of a mere aggregation of in-
dividuals. They are unfaithful to the trust when by word and example they pro-





7. The pre-trial publicity was rough. For example, a couple of days before Justice Pur-
tle's trial began in Little Rock, my friend Pat Lynch, a KARN-AM radio show host, began
his show that day with a commentary on "the troubled mind of an arsonist." The first day of
trial, I felt like we were conducting the voir dire of a lynch mob. Prejudice was coming at us
from all sides.
8. The Chief Justice, Jack Holt Jr., was out of town at the time Justice Purtle was
asked, as he put it, to "step aside." However, right before trial, the Chief was asked by the
press what impact Justice Purtle's non-participation had had on the court. He was quoted as
having said that the court had been "crippled" by Justice Purtle's non-participation. Justice




was now unfit to serve and that he might use his predicament to make it
difficult for prosecutors to keep convicted criminals convicted; or it would
appear so. Yet, ironically, two prosecutors-including Circuit Judge Chris
Piazza's old boss Wilbur C. ("Dub") Bentley-were among those who testi-
fied as Justice Purtle's character witnesses.9
To begin to understand the apparent inconsistency, you only have to
look at some of Justice Purtle's opinions. During the time he was on the
court, Justice Purtle authored 859 majority or concurring opinions. Incredi-
bly, he also wrote 470 dissenting opinions. Predictably, he ruffled feathers
doing it'°-a result you can rarely avoid in the law business if you are doing
I noted from today's media reports that you have given an interview during
which you stated that the court has been 'crippled' because I have not been par-
ticipating in decisions since the charges were filed.
In the first place, I want to remind you that I stepped aside at the request of the
other Justices (you were out of town).
Please be advised that I am ready, willing and able to assume my duties on re-
quest from you, the Chief Justice. At the request of the Court, I would be happy
to limit my participation to civil cases, to avoid even the appearance of any type
of impropriety.
Assuming that you and the other justices presume me innocent, as mandated by
the Constitution of Arkansas and the United States, I reiterate that I am ready to
assume my duties as a regularly elected Associate Justice of the Arkansas Su-
preme Court on request.
I also remind you that it was I who requested that my case go to trial in early De-
cember so that the matter could be resolved forthwith. The prosecution objected.
Additionally, it was only yesterday that the prosecution discovered there had
been extensive pre-trial, unfavorable publicity, particularly in Pulaski County;
thus necessitating another delay.





(Letter on file with the author.) No change was made by the court and Justice Purtle contin-
ued to handle administrative duties only until after his trial four months later.
9. Judge Piazza was our prosecuting attorney. Mr. Bentley was joined by prosecuting
attorney Wilbur "Dub" Arnold (who would eventually be elected Chief Justice of the Arkan-
sas Supreme Court), a sitting Circuit Judge, Floyd Lofton; Ed Bullington, President of the
Arkansas Education Association; Justice Purtle's estranged wife; and others.
10. See, e.g., Jarrett v. State, 265 Ark. 662, 665, 580 S.W.2d 460 (1979) ("I cannot com-
pel myself to remain silent in view of the majority opinion. I could not sleep well if I re-
frained from registering this dissent. My brothers have again confounded me by their reason-
ing in affirming this case. Apparently the prosecuting attorney wanted to see how far he could
go with a literal interpretation of the language in our new Criminal Code. It would be funny if
we were not dealing with the liberty of another human being."). While doing my research for
this article, I read all of Justice Purtle's dissenting opinions. Most are well worth the reading,
and some are simply priceless. But, a common and consistent theme runs through all 470 of
them. Justice Purtle loathed injustice and would expose it even when it meant sounding like a
trial judge rather than an appellate judge. He also wanted statutes strictly construed, the Bill
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your job. In addition, not only did he dissent more often than any Justice in
the court's history, during his tenure he wrote nearly twice as many opinions
as his fellow Justices. Justice Purtle also wrote just as forcefully for the ma-
jority as he did when dissenting." You cannot do that without having a pas-
sion for the law. And, I believe one of the reasons he worked that hard was
he wanted to be on the just side of an issue--one way or the other. In addi-
tion, if he believed the majority was wrong, he wanted to shine a light on its
reasoning.
In Justice Purtle's case, John Langston was our trial judge. Due to the
fact that one of Justice Purtle's alleged co-conspirators, Luther Shamlin,
intended to testify and had a previous felony conviction-and each defen-
dant had given statements to the authorities that the prosecution intended to
use-Judge Langston granted a severance. Consequently, Judge Piazza de-
cided to try Mr. Shamlin, the alleged torch, first. As a former federal prose-
cutor, I know the plan was to turn the heat up on Mr. Shamlin to plead guilty
and testify against Justice Purtle and Ms. Linda Nooner-the third alleged
co-conspirator and Justice Purtle's girlfriend. Justice Purtle's conspiracy
charge related to the alleged arson of a car and house with accelerants. Both
burned, and insurance was collected on each. Justice Purtle's defense was
that neither fire was the result of arson, but if arson was involved, he had
nothing to do with it.
During his prosecution, Mr. Shamlin was offered plea deals to testify
against Justice Purtle; but he declined. Nevertheless, Mr. Shamlin was tried
and convicted in Little Rock of arson and conspiracy and sentenced to twen-
ty-five years in the penitentiary. 2 I sat through most of the prosecution's
of Rights staunchly protected, and the law applied equally. For a listing of memorable quotes
from Justice Purtle's dissents, see Appendix A.
11. See, e.g., Perry v. State, 277 Ark. 357, 642 S.W.2d 865 (1982) (death case); Maness
v. State, 274 Ark. 69, 622 S.W.2d 166 (1981) (rape shield statute); see also Rector v. State,
280 Ark. 385, 401, 659 S.W. 2d 168, 176 (1983) (Purtle, J. concurring) ("The majority states
the most cowardly and contemptible criminals are the ones who seek to prevent a death quali-
fied jury. I am of the opinion that an accused is not considered to be a criminal, at least in the
case being tried, until after he has been convicted. The right to an impartial jury is guaranteed
by the Sixth Amendment to the United State Constitution is not, in my opinion, a favored
position not enjoyed by others. Everyone is entitled to the protection of our Constitution.").
12. See Shamlin v. State, 23 Ark. App. 39, 743 S.W.2d 1 (1988); Shamlin v. State, 19
Ark. App. 165, 718 S.W.2d 462 (1986). Mr. Shamlin's first appeal was a "Petition for per-
mission to file a petition for a Writ of Error Coram Nobis." In that appeal, Mr. Shamlin con-
tended that his case should be remanded to the trial court for a hearing on the following:
1. An insurance investigator with expertise in arson testified at Shamlin's trial
that he made an examination of the car after the fire. From his examination he
determined that the fire was of incendiary origin and his opinion was confirmed
by a chemical analysis of residue taken from the car. A written report of his ob-
servations and actions was introduced into evidence. At Justice Purtle's trial, the
same witness testified that after examining the vehicle he determined from the
2011]
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case against Mr. Shamlin, but left before the case was concluded because it
was too painful to watch. Mr. Shamlin did not testify in his case, but his
position on Justice Purtle was unwavering-the judge was not involved in
any criminal activity with him or anyone else to his knowledge.
Perhaps the State continued to think it was going to flip Mr. Shamlin,
or perhaps the prosecutors were emboldened by their solid victory. At any
rate, Judge Piazza decided to try Justice Purtle second. 13 After one day of
voir dire in Little Rock, Judge Piazza agreed with the defense that the case
should be transferred to Perry County because of jury pool bias. I have al-
ways admired Judge Piazza for that decision. I cannot recall any trial where
more people expressed the view in voir dire that someone was guilty, but I
cannot say I blame them for their opinions. The television stations and
physical evidence that the heat generated by the fire was of such intensity that it
could only have been reached by use of an accelerant. He stated that he had taken
samples from the car for chemical analysis in order to confirm his opinion and
the analysis of those samples had confirmed accelerants. The investigator testi-
fied on cross-examination, however, that he dictated his report on August 1 con-
firming the chemical analysis. The chemical analysis report was dated August 9.
In other words, the witness relied in his report on a chemical analysis that had
not yet been completed.
2. At Mr. Shamlin's trial, Homer Alexander testified that two days before the
house fire he was with Mr. Shamlin when Shamlin purchased seven containers of
Gulflight charcoal lighter fluid at Handy Dan's on Geyer Springs Road in
Southwest Little Rock. Gulflight sold for a price of $1.99 each during the time in
question. Alexander also stated that the purchase was made with cash. The pros-
ecution introduced a register tape from Handy Dan's that showed the sale of sev-
en items at $1.99 in Handy Dan's two days before the house fire. At Justice Pur-
tle's trial, it was revealed during cross-examination that the cash register tape
used by the prosecution concerned items that had in fact been paid for by check,
rather than cash as Alexander testified, and the check had been presented for
payment by Robert Palmer Photographics for "molding and paint for partition."
3. At Mr. Shamlin's trial, a second insurance adjuster introduced as a business
record an inventory said to have been made after the fire at Ms. Nooner's home.
Listed on the document were appliances which were claimed to have been de-
stroyed in the fire and the time, place, and price of their purchase. The adjuster
stated that the inventory was based on information firnished by Ms. Nooner. In
Justice Purtle's trial, it was brought out in cross-examination that at the time the
adjuster met with Ms. Nooner, he only listed the items which he believed had
been destroyed in the fire. The adjuster testified that the documentation of the
time, place and price of purchase was furnished at "a later date" and inserted on
the exhibit immediately before Mr. Shamilin's trial. The trial court ruled in Jus-
tice Purtle's case that, as the entries of value had not been made close in point of
time to the events described, the document had lost its status as a business
record, at least to the extent of the recitation of value (an issue material to the
theft by deception allegation).
The allegations were true, but Shamiin's petition was denied on procedural grounds.
13. Ms. Nooner was tried last in Perryville. She was convicted of conspiracy and sen-
tenced to three years in the penitentiary. Nooner v. State, 1988 WL 23266 (Ark. App. 1988).
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newspapers were brutal, and Mr. Shamlin had been convicted in resounding
fashion.
One statewide newspaper held particular disdain for Justice Purtle. In
addition to its tilted reporting, it ran an article shortly after Justice Purtle's
aborted Little Rock trial on "the many faces of Justice Purtle," where photo-
graphs of his appearance were shown from the time he was arrested to the
time his trial began. When Justice Purtle was arrested, he was photographed
with a mustache and long hair that nearly covered his ears. He was wearing
a short-sleeved shirt with an open collar, aviator glasses and a gold chain.
When Justice Purtle went to court in his case, he looked like a Supreme
Court Justice. Of course, we, his trial lawyers, orchestrated those changes.
And all we did was send him with our law clerk, Beth Deere, now a federal
Magistrate Judge, to a barber shop and Mae Home's clothing store on us. I
guess the newspaper was distressed with our efforts because Justice Purtle
was a distinguished looking man when he was spiffed up. Apparently for the
newspaper, the arrest outfit was more suitable for an alleged arson conspira-
tor.
Now, you might think moving a high profile trial a mere forty-five
miles away would not change things much, but it did. It was like traveling to
another country. Only a small percentage of jurors had watched television
accounts of Justice Purtle's case or admitted reading anything substantive
about it in the newspaper. As a matter of fact, a respectable number of them
had never heard of him before the first day of trial. Our problem, however,
was this was going to be the most celebrated trial Perry County had ever
seen. That was confirmed when we witnessed the freshly painted downtown
square parking stripes, the portable hot dog stand and grill across the street
from the courthouse, and the trial being interrupted by screams of "Purtle's
guilty!" from a passing school bus.
My reflections on Justice Purtle's case, however, would not do justice
to all concerned without highlighting Judge Langston. If you have any doubt
about the effect a trial judge can have on the outcome of a criminal case, just
sit as a special judge or a defendant. The pressures on an elected trial judge,
with a sitting Supreme Court Justice as the defendant, must have been
enormous. Would the press coverage cause him to be harder on this defen-
dant? Or, would he try to protect a fellow judge? There must have been
plenty of people asking those questions. I was. However, Judge Langston
did what all trial judges should strive to do. He called balls and strikes and
made sure that justice was truly blind. He did not interject himself into the
trial or help one side over the other. He refereed a fair fight. You can't ask
for more, and Justice Purtle recognized it.
I had never been to Perryville before the Purtle case. My only contact
with this pleasant town of 1500 had been with Herby Branscum, a promi-
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nent local lawyer who had the misfortune of finding himself in Special
Prosecutor Kenneth Starr's crosshairs many years later. 4 Mr. Branscum had
graciously agreed to review our jury list since he knew everyone in Perry
County. His office was our first stop when we entered the city limits, and he
helped us identify some bad jurors. For that, we were most appreciative.
Perryville has a single courtroom courthouse in the center of town. The
courthouse was rebuilt for the last time in 1888. The tiny second-floor cour-
troom took us back in time. Microphones were not available, or needed for
that matter, and the unforgiving wooden spectator benches were filled to
capacity with jurors and the press by the time of trial. In fact, many of the
149 venirmen had to stand outside the courthouse while they waited their
turn during voir dire. The worn counsel tables were separated by a narrow
aisle, and the lawyers addressed the spartan bench from an oak podium dar-
kened with age.
Judge Wilson handled voir dire for the defense."5 It was as skillful as I
had ever seen. 6 I gave the opening statement. My goal in every opening was
to make sure the case was viewed by the jury as a horse race before the evi-
dence began. I think I did that.'7 By the time the State called its first witness,
we knew the jurors had come for a fight. And, that is exactly what they got.
Now, at this point, I think it is important to address Justice Purtle's
perceived motivation for his prosecution. He felt he was being prosecuted
because Judge Piazza and other prosecutors did not like him and his deci-
sions in criminal cases, and because Judge Piazza wanted to make a name
for himself. Judge Wilson and I never got that impression. What I believe
happened was that Judge Piazza and his Chief Deputy Lloyd King in partic-
ular were sold a bill of goods. They accepted the word of a Luther Shamlin
antagonist, Homer Alexander, and relied on the opinions of three prosecu-
tion fire investigators who were corroborated by "salted evidence" (as Judge
Wilson put it). It turned out that one of the fire samples taken three months
after the fire from the charred remains of the car, and subsequently offered
14. Mr. Starr was appointed to investigate Bill and Hillary Clinton's Whitewater land
development case. But his investigation spread like the Bubonic Plague to include Arkansas
governor Jim Guy Tucker, Mr. Branscum, and countless others having no connection to
Whitewater. See, e.g., United States v. Tucker, 217 F.3d 960 (8th Cir. 2000); United States v.
Tucker, 137 F.3d 1016 (8th Cir. 1998). Mr. Branscum was absolved of fraud charges in fed-
eral district court in Little Rock. United States v. Branscum, No. LR-CR-96-49 (E.D. Ark.,
June 7, 1996).
15. You can read portions of Judge Wilson's voir dire in JAMES W. JEANS, TRIAL
ADVOCACY (2d ed. 1993).
16. By that time, I had seen voir dire conducted by such courtroom warriors as Reggie
Eilbott, Jack Holt Jr., W.B. "Tuffy" Howard, Alston Jennings Sr., William "Bill" McArthur,
Dale Price, and Henry Woods.




by the state as evidence of an accelerant, was found to contain "raw" gaso-
line. 8 The prosecutors were also relying on suspicious tape recordings, most
of which were found to be inadmissible in Justice Purtle's case, as well as
the Justice's contradictory pre-trial statements.
The trial was everything I imagined it would be. Judge Piazza was a
formidable opponent and the drama built with every witness. There were
fiery objections, passionate arguments, slashing cross-examinations, surpris-
ing courtroom strategies, visible jury reactions, interesting conspiracy issues
and a clash of experts-eight in all.
We battled for nearly two weeks-a lengthy state trial for 1986. Then
came the time for us to decide whether we would call Justice Purtle as a
witness. Before that decision was made, however, the prosecution made a
plea offer to Justice Purtle, which included a misdemeanor guilty plea, no
time and his resignation from the Arkansas Supreme Court. It took Justice
Purtle about two seconds to turn it down. He told me after trial that day that
he would rather go to the penitentiary than resign from the Arkansas Su-
preme Court for something he did not do.
When I was a prosecutor, it made my day in trial when the defense
called the defendant to the stand. I learned early on that in complicated
white-collar crime cases, if the defendant took the stand, the dynamics of the
case changed. Instead of the jury having to sort out complicated facts and
conflicting testimony, often the case was reduced by the jury to a simple
issue: did the defendant tell the truth? As a result of those experiences, when
I became a defense attorney, I rarely called my client to the stand. When an
exception was made, I usually regretted it. One of those exceptions was the
case of State v. Purtle.
Justice Purtle, under previous counsel, had given two sworn pre-trial
statements to Mr. King. Aside from the questionable wisdom of giving a
statement, he was not adequately prepared before he answered questions
and, unfortunately, some of the answers in his first statement turned out to
be untrue.
We worked with Justice Purtle for days before he testified. When the
time came, my stomach was in my throat. But Justice Purtle handled Judge
Wilson's direct and Mr. King's cross-examination superbly. 9 He was as
18. Dr. Morris Cramner, a highly qualified toxicologist and defense expert, analyzed the
sample after it had been sent to a Memphis lab by one of the insurance investigators. A year
after his testimony, Dr. Cramner found himself on the receiving end of a federal indictment.
See United States v. Craner, 871 F. 2d 1091 (8th Cir. 1988). The defense also offered testi-
mony from an independent lab about the samples from the house used by the prosecution to
corroborate Mr. Alexander's charcoal lighter fluid story. The testimony was that the samples
contained "exylenes," which are not found in charcoal lighter fluid.
19. 1 never understood the strategy behind Mr. King conducting the cross-examination.
Everyone was expecting Judge Piazza to take Justice Purtle on. When he did not, the letdown
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calm as any defendant I have ever seen in the courtroom. I have thought
about that many times because the stakes couldn't have been higher. Look-
ing back, I think his calmness was the product of his love for the law. He
believed in the jury system with all his heart and, if given a fair trial, he was
convinced he would be found not guilty.
After arguments and instructions, it was late in the day. Due to the
number and size of the exhibits, and the matchbox-sized jury room, Judge
Langston decided everyone should leave the courthouse and allow the jury
to deliberate in the courtroom. So the courtroom spectators, press, and par-
ties filed out and gathered under the trees on the front lawn of the court-
house. When that happened, about 100 additional spectators joined us. I still
remember standing in the dark, looking up at the courtroom windows, won-
dering how the deliberations were going and what the verdict would be.
Only a dedicated trial lawyer can understand what it is like to wait for a jury
verdict in a criminal case. It is pure agony.
Because of space considerations, when the jury announced that it had a
verdict,2" only a limited number of people were permitted to enter the cour-
troom. The not guilty verdict was announced and Judge Purtle and I em-
braced. I could feel the tension leave his body. His son and daughter cried.
Judge Wilson led the defense team to shake the prosecutors' hands.
We exited the front door of the courthouse to a scene from a Holly-
wood movie. Understandably, the press was eager to get Justice Purtle's
reaction. For me, this was the only time I was disappointed in him. I had
expected him to thank the jurors for their verdict, reaffirm his faith in the
jury system and leave it at that. But he didn't. Among other things, Justice
Purtle said, "I think one of the most important lessons to be learned for the
prosecutor is you can't just pick off a judge you don't like."' He also ques-
tioned the prosecution's motive by stating, "(a) young prosecutor who wants
to get ahead can take down a big man in his first term. It's been reported to
me that he said he could be attorney general... and governor after that."22 A
in the courtroom was palpable. Justice Purtle also testified in Ms. Nooner's Perryville trial
which resulted in her conviction. Judge Piazza conducted the cross-examination in that trial,
and Justice Purtle handled it poorly. Indicative of the tone of the cross-examination was the
last question and answer:
"Q: Judge, you mentioned Ms. Nooner, or was it yourself, when you said that
they were out of touch with reality? Who were you testifying about?
A: I might have been talking about you. I don't remember."
20. While it was reported that the jury deliberated "1 1/2 hours" and "about two hours;"
it was much less. Most of the time was taken up by the jurors standing in line for a break at
the solitary courthouse bathroom. We were also told later that there were two jury votes. The
first was eleven to one for acquittal.
21. Bruce Kinzel, Jury Declares Purtle Innocent of Conspiracy, ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT,




rare opportunity to disarm his critics was lost. I have thought about that
moment many times over the years and wished we could have gotten him
aside before he said that to the press. But I guess the stress and frustration of
being prosecuted was just too much for him to handle at that moment. Eve-
rything he had worked so hard for in his career was on the line that day. It
was an emotional time.
Justice Purtle's verdict was returned on Friday, March 23, 1986. The
following Monday, he sat with the other Justices for a full day of arguments.
Ironically, Judge Wilson and I were arguing one of the cases.2 3 We were
happy we helped return him to the bench, but I can tell you some members
of the court were not.
Justice Purtle's acquittal also occurred shortly before the Arkansas Bar
Association annual meeting. That year, the Gridiron planned a show for the
Association members in attendance. Of course, they included something
about Justice Purtle's case, complete with a cast member's match-lighting
solo rendition of Justice Purtle singing "I Don't Want to Light the World on
Fire." I can still hear the roars of laughter and, yes, Justice Purtle was in
attendance. He had very thick skin by that time, but he left the meeting that
day and returned to the one thing that provided him with a full measure of
comfort-his office and the law.24
Justice Purtle served undeterred on the Arkansas Supreme Court for
three years after his acquittal.2 5 In his final year, he explained his judicial
philosophy to a reporter as trying to "protect the Constitution and particular-
ly the Bill of Rights from the courts. 26 Perhaps Justice Purtle's philosophy
had been partially shaped by his prosecution. For he now knew for a certain-
ty how much a biased trial judge or an intellectually dishonest appellate
judge can determine the outcome of a criminal case and whether someone
goes to prison unjustly.
One might reasonably assume that Justice Purtle's recent death
prompted my writing this article. However, the real reason was an obituary
that appeared in a statewide newspaper highlighting his being charged with
conspiracy to commit arson for profit while a Supreme Court Justice. Of
area newspapers, only the Log Cabin Democrat chose not to write about
Justice Purtle's criminal case after his death. I have no way of knowing why.
23. Alexander v. Chapman, 289 Ark. 238, 722 S.W.2d 765 (1986) (Purtle, J. and Holt,
C.J., not participating) (the improper trial tactics case-a must-read for every trial lawyer).
24. Justice Purtle seemed to double his efforts after he was found not guilty. During
1987-88, the first full term after his acquittal, he wrote 117 opinions. Fifty were dissents. The
remaining justices authored approximately seventy-five opinions each.
25. When Justice Purtle resigned, then-Governor Bill Clinton appointed Otis Turner to
serve as interim Justice.
26. Leveritt, supra note 2, at 85. Justice Purtle felt he was "not a full member" of the
court and "a voice crying in the wilderness" shortly before his resignation. Id. at 26.
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Perhaps, even though his charges created a spectacle, to the newspaper, they
were still just accusations.
I, too, feel Justice Purtle deserves to be remembered for what he did in
life-not for the accusations lodged against him. He was one of nine child-
ren born to sharecropper parents who taught him the meaning of education
and hard work. He joined the infantry at age seventeen, five days after the
attack on Pearl Harbor, and served for five years in the Asiatic-Pacific Thea-
ter before returning home. He enrolled in what is now the University of
Central Arkansas under the GI Bill and ultimately transferred to the Univer-
sity of Arkansas at Fayetteville, where he graduated from law school. He
represented the Pulaski County School District and was elected state repre-
sentative twice before he was elected to the Arkansas Supreme Court. He
served on the court for eleven years. He practiced law nearly sixty years
before he became ill. And, he was a good sibling, son, father, and husband.
For those of you who felt an abiding loss when he left the Arkansas
Supreme Court27 and again with his passing, do not despair. You may rest
assured that he is holding court in a place where justice is swift, sure and
pure. A place where the last are always first and justice is tempered with
mercy. And, he is at peace knowing that through his adversity he stayed the
course for the underprivileged, those in the minority, and those constitution-
al principles he so cherished.28
APPENDIX A
Hall v. State, 264 Ark. 885, 888, 890, 567 S.W.2d 178, 180-81 (1979)
(Justice Purtle's first dissenting opinion.)("The prosecuting attorney and his
deputies are public officers performing their duties in a quasi-judicial capac-
ity.. . This function should be carried out with vigor, and any honorable,
reasonable and lawful means should be employed. There should be no occa-
sion to deliberately appeal to the prejudices which most of us possess. Juries
are for the most part composed of people with ordinary intelligence, with
variances of course, and are likely to look upon a public official in the per-
formances of his/her duties with more confidence than a lawyer who is be-
ing paid to defend an accused .... However, [the prosecutor's] remark may
27. Dean DiPippa, on learning Justice Purtle might leave the court, had this to say, "If he
doesn't run again, I don't anticipate anyone in his mold being elected. What we've done is
create a mold in which very cautious, very ordinary, very conventional people are elected to
the bench. If you have a court full of cautious, conventional jurists, what you get is a cau-
tious, conventional jurisprudence, and that's a jurisprudence that's divorced from the life of
the community." Id. at 86.
28. The last quote I could find of Justice Purtle on his judicial philosophy was: "I may
march to the beat of a different drummer, but I have never marched with a goose step." Id.
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well have added years to the sentence of appellant .... For the reason cited
above and the long-range effect of fair trials, I would reverse and remand for
a new trial."); Sutton v. State, 265 Ark. 645, 646, 580 S.W.2d 195, 196
(1979) ("The [pro se] appellant has filed the record and a brief before this
Court. Perhaps a more disorganized brief has never been presented to this
Court. However, within that brief is a copy of an alleged statement made by
the trial judge, to the jury, during their deliberations on this action, which
should not and cannot be allowed to stand if our system of justice is to pre-
vail. When the jury asked for additional instructions the court, among other
things, allegedly stated: 'EVEN IN A CASE LIKE THIS WHERE THERE
IS OBVIOUS GUILT A JURY HAS WIDE LATITUDE . . .' The above
statement was not taken by the court reporter and is 'outside' the record so
far as the majority is concerned and they even cite a statute and a case to
support their position. A hundred statutes and a hundred cases would not
change my opinion that we are not doing justice when we fail to look at an
error of this magnitude on the ground that it is outside the record. The only
reason we have the statement, which is considered outside the record, is that
the appellant had the foresight to have his cassette recorder turned on at the
time this incident happened."); Plummer v. State, 270 Ark. 11, 16, 603
S.W.2d 402, 405 (1980) ("I believe the lineup as conducted was unduly
suggestive. The only manner in which it could have been more indicative
would have been to have placed a sign around the appellant's neck that
stated, 'This is the one."'); Stillers v. State, 272 Ark. 212, 216, 613 S.W.2d
387, 390-91 (1981) ("By delaying the motion [in limine] until the prosecu-
tion asked the questions before the jury is too late. It is like shutting the gate
after the horse is out. The only reason a prosecutor would want to wait until
this time and ask such questions is solely for the purpose of inflaming the
jury or to create prejudice against an accused. A prosecutor is supposed to
be seeking the truth and affording the state and the accused a fair and impar-
tial trial. I do not consider such questions to fit in the category of fair and
proper."); Wilson v. State, 272 Ark. 361, 364, 614 S.W.2d 663, 664 (1981)
("I dissent with amazement at the action of this court in handing down two
opinions on the same date holding directly opposite each other."); Chism v.
State, 273 Ark. 1, 11, 616 S.W.2d 728, 733 (1981) ("There certainly is no
precedent for the trial court or this court to complete the state's cases for it
when it fails to do so. I do not want to be any part of starting such a prac-
tice."); Stull v. Ragsdale, 273 Ark. 277, 285, 620 S.W.2d 264, 269 (1981)
("The majority has marched full speed ahead into the Nineteenth Century
with this [wrongful death case] opinion."); Bizzell v. White, 274 Ark. 511,
517, 625 S.W.2d 528, 531 (1981) ("I disagree with the majority opinion
when it states that a portion of the reapportionment plan for the state cannot
be attacked unless the entire plan is attacked. If a dog bites my ankle, he has
surely attacked my body as a whole."); Barnes v. Barnes, 275 Ark. 117, 119,
627 S.W.2d 552, 554 (1982) ("1 dissent from the majority opinion which I
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feel is an incorrect interpretation and application of the law as well as a most
unjust decision. I realize we are frequently forced by law to make unjust
decisions but this one was freely and voluntarily made by the court."); Zar-
din v. Terry, 275 Ark 452, 456, 631 S.W.2d 285, 288 (1982) ("Sometimes it
seems to me this court strains at a gnat and swallows a camel."); Carroll v.
State, 276 Ark. 160, 166-67, 634 S.W.2d 99, 103 (1982) ("Neither the Ar-
kansas General Assembly nor the Supreme Court of Arkansas has the power
to invalidate the 4th and the 14th Amendments to the Constitution of the
United States of America. The majority opinion, it seems to me, has at-
tempted to either annul or circumvent the provisions of those Amendments.
The court cannot contravene the United States Constitution through the use
of misnomers. That is precisely what the majority opinion has attempted to
do by substituting the word 'inspection' for 'search.' A rose by any other
name smells the same."); Roy v. Atkins, 276 Ark. 586, 589, 637 S.W.2d 598,
600 (1982) ("I am shocked by the majority opinion in this case. I have never
found any jurisdiction, including Arkansas, which prohibited a person from
giving oral testimony about medical expenses incurred as a result of a per-
sonal injury."); Hoggard v. State, 277 Ark. 117, 125, 640 S.W.2d 102, 107
(1982) ("I respectfully dissent because I think both the affidavit and search
warrant are as phony as a $3 bill."); Rowell v. State, 278 Ark. 217, 221, 644
S.W.2d 596, 599 (1983) ("I strongly disagree with the majority in this case.
I think the opinion will have a chilling effect on most lawyers who represent
people accused of a crime."); Brown v. State, 278 Ark. 604, 608, 648
S.W.2d 67, 70 (1983) ("The dastardly crime resulted in the senseless shoot-
ing of a respected, popular and talented white teenager by two unknown
black males. There was soon raised a public hue and cry for the apprehen-
sion of the perpetrators. Certainly the public was justified in demanding that
justice be done. However, that demand for justice has, in my opinion, re-
sulted in a severe injustice."); Matthews v. Rodgers, 279 Ark. 328, 337, 651
S.W.2d 453, 459 (1983) ("This is in many respects a very tragic case. The
majority's opinion today does nothing but magnify the tragedy. My con-
science will not allow me to join the majority opinion which, in my opinion,
is as unreasonable and unfair as the judgment of the trial court. I realize it is
our custom to state only the facts supporting the verdict when we affirm the
judgment of a trial court. However, we are not required to ignore the other
facts altogether."); Walls v. State, 280 Ark. 291, 297, 658 S.W.2d 362, 366
(1983) ("Were we merely joking in Spears v. State? The majority opinion
sets the stage for unknown persons to entrap people who would not other-
wise violate our laws. I think I detect a goosestep in our cadence." (citation
omitted)); James v. State, 280 Ark. 359, 370, 658 S.W.2d 382, 388 (1983)
("The direction taken by the majority in this case chills me to the bone. It is
beyond my comprehension how the law enforcement officers, the prosecutor
and the trial court could all so clearly bulldoze through appellant's constitu-
tional rights and be upheld on appeal."); Simpson v. Langston, 281 Ark. 458,
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466, 664 S.W.2d 872, 876 (1984) (challenge to Grand Jury Report on Little
Rock Police Chief) ("Grand juries are made up of reputable citizens residing
in the county. Thus they become the voice and conscience of the county. It
is not their privilege only, but also their duty, to speak out on matters of
public concern and interest. We should not quiet their voice or still their
conscience."); Neyland v. Hunter, 282 Ark. 323, 330, 668 S.W.2d 530, 533
(1984) ("The best I can figure, the majority holds Ark. Stat. Ann. § 76-104
and 105 are probably constitutional but have a meaning other than what they
state. This is the most strained and warped construction I have ever had the
duty to read."); Berna v. State, 282 Ark. 563, 571, 670 S.W.2d 434, 439
(1984) ("A defendant is entitled to know when and why panel members are
excused from serving at his trial. If 75% of those selected are ineligible to
serve there is something wrong with the use of the jury wheel. In the future I
will vote to reverse any judgment from any county when the selection of a
jury is as haphazard as is demonstrated here. Likely there was no intent to
do wrong; nevertheless it leaves a bad impression."); Jones v. State, 283
Ark. 308, 315, 675 S.W.2d 825, 829 (1984) ("How far must we go before
we adopt the plain error rule beyond [Coones, Barnum, Singleton, Wilson &
Dancy, Sims, and Bell]? Precedent or not there comes a time when this court
should step in and correct prejudicial errors even though not technically
raised at the trial level." (citations omitted)); Holmes v. City of Little Rock,
285 Ark. 296, 306, 686 S.W.2d 425, 430 (1985) ("I must again respectfully
dissent. The majority set out the correct law concerning annexations of adja-
cent territory by cities then promptly forgot what it said and wrote a nice
sounding piece of social legislation."); Morrison v. Morrison, 286 Ark. 353,
357, 692 S.W.2d 601, 604 (1985) ("I strongly disagree with the majority
opinion in treating disability benefits as marital property.") Hess v. Treece,
286 Ark. 434, 446, 693 S.W.2d 792, 799 (1985) ("In my opinion, the only
outrage to be found in this [tort of outrage] case is the majority opinion.");
Mullenax v. Langston, 286 Ark. 470, 472, 692 S.W.2d 755, 757 (1985) ("I
do not understand by what rationale the majority recognizes we did not have
a death penalty in 1972, but implies that the 1976 Criminal Code establish-
ing capital murder relates back to the time when there was no such law. That
is ex post facto and completely unacceptable to me."); Wilburn v. State, 289
Ark. 224, 231-34, 711 S.W.2d 760, 763-65 (1986) (Justice Purtle's first
dissenting opinion after his acquittal, a case from Judge John Langston's
court, where he maintained that Judge Langston abused his discretion in
excluding a defense expert and in the admission of evidence); Hedrick v.
State, 292 Ark. 411, 415, 730 S.W.2d 488, 491 (1987) ("This Court has
reached the pinnacle of affirmance in this case by upholding the finding of
guilt for a crime which was never charged. So far as I am concerned, the
sentence of life without parole is as void as a death sentence issued by a
municipal judge. Good-bye due process and equal protection."); Harvey v.
Bell, 292 Ark. 657, 661-62, 732 S.W.2d 138, 141 (1987) ("The majority
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opinion literally adds insult to injury inasmuch as the opinion not only al-
lows the appellee to appropriate the appellant's property for his own use, it
also takes away the piddling sum awarded by the trial court. I am beginning
to understand the dialogue between Socrates and Thrasymachus, as recorded
by Plato in his Republic, where it is stated: 'Justice is in the interest of the
stronger."); Jones v. Ragland, 293 Ark. 320, 328, 737 S.W.2d 641, 646
(1987) ("Jones is apparently a fiercely independent man, and obviously a
dissenter. Nevertheless, he is entitled to the same rights as other citizens. It
seems to me that the Boston Tea Party was carried out by the likes of Theo-
dore Jones. He may be a thorn in the side of tax collectors but he still de-
serves equal and fair treatment under the law. I do not think he has been
treated fairly. This case is a clear example of the strong hand of the govern-
ment reaching into the lives and trampling upon the rights of individuals in
order to reach a result desired by the government."); Coble v. Lockhart, 293
Ark. 515, 517, 739 S.W.2d 164, 165 (1987) ("Regardless of the fact that we
seem to weave back and forth on the matter of appointment of counsel and
acceptance of handprinted briefs, we cannot deny the fact that every indi-
vidual is entitled to represent himself. These inmates are individuals and
they have a Constitutional right to represent themselves in this Court. They
cannot proceed if money is required or if their briefs must be typewritten.
Therefore, we should grant the appellant the right to file a handwritten mo-
tion and brief in support of his claim for relief."); Smith v. State, 294 Ark.
357, 360, 742 S.W.2d 936, 938 (1988) ("In the case of Ward v. State, we
'wholeheartedly' endorsed the Batson decision prohibiting purposeful dis-
crimination in the jury selection process. Before the ink is dry on Ward we
have begun the process of backtracking and limiting its application." (cita-
tion omitted)); Finley v. State, 295 Ark. 357, 366, 748 S.W.2d 643, 648
(1988) ("The majority opinion is part of a familiar pattern of judicial en-
croachment upon legislative and executive powers. No matter how clear and
unambiguous a statute may be, the judiciary often bends the words into what
the courts believe the law ought to be. There is no need to cite precedent in
this dissent. Neither precedent nor the separation of powers doctrine seem to
deter this court from making new law every Monday morning."); Gage v.
State, 295 Ark. 337, 339, 340, 748 S.W.2d 351, 352, 353 (1988) ("The re-
cent cure-all theory that 'the evidence of guilt is overwhelming' is a blight
and parasite on the laws and the Constitution. In street language it is a 'cop-
out.' It is a cancer which should be exorcised here and now. It is a step away
from our traditional claim to be a nation of laws .... So long as we label
defects in trials as 'harmless constitutional error,' there is no incentive on
the part of the state or the courts to follow the law or rules of evidence.");
Smith v. State, 296 Ark. 451, 457, 757 S.W.2d 554, 557 (1988) ("I think we
ought to follow the law but in doing so we should use common sense and
apply that degree of justice which is compatible with the law. Basically, I
disagree with this outrageous sentence, which indicates a need for sentenc-
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ing guidelines at the state level."); Davis v. State, 296 Ark. 524, 526, 758
S.W.2d 706, 707 (1988) ("I almost neglected to dissent in this case because
I didn't recognize the facts as set forth in the majority opinion as the same
case argued in the briefs and considered by this court."), overruled by Gra-
ble v. State, 298 Ark. 489, 769 S.W.2d 9 (1989); Brazel v. State, 296 Ark.
563, 568, 571, 759 S.W.2d 28, 31, 32 (1988) ("However, to hold that the
introduction of a codefendant's signed 'confession' was 'harmless error' is
almost beyond belief.... If the United State Supreme Court's rulings are
not binding on this court, then I need write no more."); Bragg v. State, 297
Ark. 348, 352, 760 S.W.2d 878, 880 (1988) ("Upon actual consideration of
the petition, this court found a procedural error: the transcript was not timely
ordered by the inmate. The court apparently fails to recognize that this no-
tice of appeal and request to proceed in forma pauperis were forwarded from
the maximum security unit at Cummins. That is hardly a place where one
would expect an inmate to be able to contact the court reporter and order the
record."); Clayton v. Clayton, 297 Ark. 342, 345, 760 S.W.2d 875, 877-78
(1988) ("There seems to be no end to the imagination of the majority of the
members of this Court relating to what marital property consists of when
one spouse receives an injury giving rise to a claim for income or money
damages .... This court is hard-headed and at times legislates when it de-
cides it knows what the law ought to be. It looks like the General Assembly
will have to make a fifth effort to write a law which this court under-
stands."); Lee v. State, 297 Ark. 421, 427, 762 S.W.2d 790, 793 (1989) ("1
write primarily to call attention to the unfairness with which I believe this
Court sometimes handles appeals."); Cash v. State Bd of Pardons and Pa-
roles, 297 Ark. 625, 626, 765 S.W.2d 4, 4-5 (1989) ("In no case could it be
made more plain that a person has been denied equal protection and due
process because he is poor. He would have received his right to proceed in
this case if he had the money. No person should be forced to give up statuto-
ry or constitutional rights because of poverty."); White v. State, 298 Ark.
163, 168, 765 S.W.2d 949, 953 (1989) ("I could not sleep tonight if I failed
to dissent in this [marijuana and illegal weapon] case."); Becker v. State, 298
Ark. 438, 441, 443-44, 768 S.W. 2d 527, 529, 530 (1989) ("Either some-
thing is wrong with our criminal justice system or something is wrong with
this case. No fair system of justice could sanction giving a man fifteen years
in prison for stealing a few slices of ham .... However, this case does noth-
ing to promote a fair and just criminal justice system. It is, in fact, a blight
upon our system. If this court will not correct it, then the Governor and the
General Assembly should."); Whitmore v. State, 299 Ark. 55, 68-69, 771
S.W. 2d 266, 272 (1989) (decision abolishing Arkansas' post-conviction
relief procedure) ("Petitioner's case is presently pending before the United
States Supreme Court. Under the circumstance, this court should pause in its
haste to dismantle post-conviction relief until after the United States Su-
preme Court decides the matter .... The majority opinion is primarily in-
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tended to soothe the conscience of the court. If this were not the case, we
would simply do as we usually do when presented with a petition for Rule
37 relief and deny it without issuing an opinion."); Rolark v. State, 299 Ark.
299, 304, 305, 772 S.W.2d 588, 591, 592 (1989) ("Another mistake made by
the majority is its approval of the practice of allowing the state to abide only
by the rules it chooses .... The bench and bar of this state deserve the right
to know the rules of criminal procedure and how to conduct a trial."); Cour-
teau v. Dodd, 299 Ark. 380, 388, 390, 773 S.W.2d 436, 440, 441 (1989)
("We should abandon the archaic rule that dictates that before an injured
person may proceed against a physician, he must have another physician
who is willing to testify that the treating physician did not use the degree of
care required. . . .Our court-made rule requiring a physician to testify
against another in support of a plaintiffs claim is, at the very least, obsolete.
... The jury did not need the testimony of an expert witness to interpret the
facts in this case."); Duhon v. State, 299 Ark. 503, 512, 774 S.W.2d 830,
836 (1989) ("Arkansas has won another distinction: it is the only state in the
nation which imposes criminal sanctions on a person who does not pay his
rent on time.... The majority has, with all the speed of a crawfish, backed
into the 19th century."); Crawford/Sebastian Cnty. SCAN v. Kelly, 300 Ark.
206, 209, 778 S.W.2d 219, 221 (1989) ("Whenever the state usurps the role
of the family in matters relating to the rearing and disciplining of children, it
has gone too far."), overruled by Ark. Dep't of Human Serv., St. Francis
Div. of Children and Family Serv. v. Thompson, 331 Ark. 181, 959 S. W.2d
46 (1998); Ferguson v. Sunbay Lodge, Ltd., 301 Ark. 87, 89, 781 S.W.2d
491, 492 (1989) ("We set a trap for lawyers when we amended A.R.A.P.4(c)
.... "); Schrader v. Bell, 301 Ark. 38, 42, 44, 781 S.W.2d 466, 468, 469
(1989) (Justice Purtle's final dissent) ("I am pleased to see that the majority
has, somewhat belatedly, joined my dissent in Penny v. Phillips.... I can
now retire with a sense that my opinions have, after all, sometimes had an
effect. I only hope that in the future my dissents relating to the Bill of Rights
and other constitutional issues will have an equal impact." (citation omit-
ted)).
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